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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

DAVID K GILLETT, an individual,
and MAJESTIC AIR SERVICES,
INCORPORATED, a Utah
corporation,

)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs-Petitioners )
)
)

vs

STEVE PRICE, an individual,
Defendant-Respondent

PETITIONERS'
OPENING BRIEF FOR
CERTIORARI REVIEW
OF A
COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION

)
) Case No. 2005-0023SC

DESIGNATION OF PARTIES
The

Plaintiff-Petitioner

DAVID

K

GILLETT

is

a

natural person, a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. The
Plaintiff-Petitioner MAJESTIC AIR SERVICES, INCORPORATED,
is a Utah corporation, of which David K Gillett is the
corporate president and sole shareholder.
The Defendant-Respondent STEVE PRICE is a natural
person, a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah.
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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The

"certiorari"

review

presents

and

has

been

granted
namely,

for the single issue presented
whether

the

"post-trial"

for review:
motion

for

reconsideration tolled the running of the "appeal" period
until the District Court had ruled upon the "motion for
reconsideration [summary judgment for defendant]".
The Court of Appeals ruled that the Appellants'
"post-trial" motions did not toll the running of the 30day period in which to file the "notice of appeal".
On certiorari review, the Supreme Court reviews the
Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
court

not of the trial

for correctness; the conclusions of law of the

Court of Appeals are afforded no deference. Bear River
Mutual Insurance Company vs Wall, 978 P. 2d 460 at 461
(Utah Supreme Court 1999).
CITATION TO COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The Court of Appeals decision for which certiorari
review is sought is incorporated in the "Memorandum
Decision

Not for Official Publication"

[hereinafter

referred to as "the Court of Appeals Decision" or simply
"the Decision"] in the case of David K Gillett and
Majestic Air Services, Incorporated vs Steve Price, 2004
UT App 460 (decided 9 December 2004), Appellate Case No.
20040682-CA. A photocopy of the Decision is included
herein as APPENDIX #4 to this Petition.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction

over

the

"appeal"

originally

was

exercised pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-22(3) (j) , Utah Code [Supreme Court has original appellate
jurisdiction for appeals of civil cases from the District
Court] . The Utah Supreme Court "poured over" the case to
the Court of Appeals, which issued the Decision pursuant
to its sua sponte motion for "summary disposition".
The Supreme Court has granted

the Petitioners'

request for certiorari review of the Court of Appeals
Decision.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
There are no operative provisions of constitutional
and statutory provisions applicable to certiorari review.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiffs' original claim is for "breach of
contract" by the Defendant, a former employee. The facts,
essentially undisputed, are that the Defendant, while
employed

as

the

"Parts

Department

Manager"

of

the

Plaintiff MAJESTIC AIR SERVICES "embezzled" approximately
$80,000 worth of aviation radios and navigation equipment
and sold the same to an out-of-state purchaser, at a mere
fraction of their true value.1

x

The Defendant PRICE pleaded "guilty" to a federal
felony of interstate shipment of stolen property.

The instant

"appeal"

(to the Court of Appeals)

presented itself in the context of a "motion for summary
judgment", in which the Defendant asserted he did not
"recall"

(Defendant's

terminology)

any

"written"

instrument which would support Plaintiffs' allegations
(i.e. that the "breach of contract" claim was based upon
an

"instrument

obligations
scope

in

writing").

If

the

Defendant's

nevertheless disputed as to nature and

were founded upon an "instrument in writing",

then the case would be timely filed and the Defendant's
"motion

for

summary

judgment"

(on

"statute

of

limitations" grounds) would be unsuccessful. Plaintiffs
responded by identifying the "written documents" and
provided authenticated copies thereof to the Defendant
and to the Court. The Defendant's "motion for summary
judgment" was originally considered by the District Court
at the "oral argument" hearing on January 7th, 2004. No
judgment was announced at that time and the partylitigants were given the opportunity to conduct pre-trial
discovery. During his Deposition the Defendant PRICE
acknowledged the preparation and execution of a two-page
written document (by him), together with execution (by
him) of a second 2-page document prepared by his employer
MAJESTIC AIR SERVICES.
In April

2004

the Defendant

PRICE

renewed his

"motion for summary judgment", essentially along the
previously-asserted lines (that there was no "instrument
in writing"

upon

which

the

Plaintiffs'

"breach of

contract" claims were based, and thus a 4-year statute of
limitation
contracts

was

applicable

to

the

case

and now barred prosecution

(for

of

"oral"

the case).

Plaintiffs responded to the renewed "motion for summary
judgment" and the case was again argued to the District
Court, which issued a "Memorandum Decision" on or about
26 May 2004.
On or about 9 June 2004 the Plaintiffs filed a
"Motion

for Reconsideration

Summary Judgment]".

[Defendant's

[A photocopy

Motion

for

of the Motion for

Reconsideration is attached hereto as APPENDIX #1. The
supporting Memorandum

of Law is attached

hereto as

APPENDIX #2 . ]
The "motion for reconsideration" was filed actually
BEFORE the entry of the "final judgment" (on June 16th).
On

24

June

2004

the

Defendant

filed

a

responsive

Memorandum of Law. On or about 21 July (ruling) and/or 27
July (minute entry) 2004 the District Court entered a
"minute

entry"

order

denying

the

"motion

for

reconsideration". [See APPENDIX #3.]
On 1 September 2004 the Court of Appeals, in a sua
sponte order, raised the issue of the timeliness of the

filing of the notice of appeal and directed the partylitigants to respond to that issue, in the context of a
summary disposition. On or about 2 September 2004 the
Defendant-Appellee simultaneously filed a "motion for
summary disposition" concerning the claimed untimely
filing of the "notice of appeal".
On 9 December 2004 the Court of Appeals issued its
per

curiam

"Memorandum

Publication",

signed

by

Decision
a

Not

for

three-member

Official

panel.

[A

photocopy of the Court of Appeals Decision is attached
hereto at APPENDIX #4.]
ARGUMENT
THE TIMELY FILING OF THE "POST-TRIAL" MOTION
TOLLED THE 3 0-DAY PERIOD
IN WHICH TO FILE THE "NOTICE OF APPEAL"
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires the "notice of appeal" to be filed within 30
days of the entry of the "final judgment", which would
have

been

16

June

2004

but

for

the

post-judgment

"motion".
However, Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure

contemplates

"post-trial"

and/or

"post-

judgment" motions and provides in relevant part:
(b) Motions post-judgment or order. If a timely
motion under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
is filed in the trial court by any party (1)
for judgment under Rule 50(b), (2) under Rule
7

52(b) to amend or make additional findings of
fact, whether or not an alteration of the
judgment would be required if the motion is
granted, (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend
the judgment, or (4) under Rule 5 9 for a new
trial, the time for appeal for all parties
shall run from the entry of the order denying a
new trial or granting or denying any other such
motion. . . .
Emphasis added.
Within

the

instant

[Defendant's Motion

"Motion

for

Reconsideration

for Summary Judgment]",

and more

specifically the "Memorandum in Support", are addressed
numerous

"matters

of

law"

in

which

the

Plaintiffs

asserted the District Court had made "error of law" [see
Rule 59(a) (7)]. [See APPENDIX #2 to this Petition.]
The instant situation is not factually and legally
distinguishable from that presented in the decision of
the Utah Supreme Court in Gallardo vs Bolinder, 800 P. 2d
816 (Utah Supreme Court 1990). In Gallardo the Supreme
Court was faced with a situation involving a "motion for
relief from judgment", in which the Court of Appeals
considering the civil case following "pour over" from the
Supreme Court

had concluded the appeal was untimely

filed. The Utah Supreme Court summarily reversed and
reinstated the appeal and directed that the appeal be
considered on the merits in that forum
Appeals). The Supreme Court wrote:

8

(i.e. Court of

A motion for relief from judgment, if filed
within 10 days after the entry of judgment,
will be treated as a post-judgment motion
tolling the time for appeal. "If the nature of
the motion can be ascertained from the
substance of the instrument, we have heretofore
held that an improper caption is not fatal to
that motion." Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian,
657 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1983) (citing Howard v.
Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 152, 356 P.2d 275, 276
(1960) .
Emphasis added. 800 P.2d at 817. Emphasis added.
In arriving at its conclusion (i.e. the post-trial
"motion for relief from judgment" tolled the running of
the appeal period) the Supreme Court also relied upon the
provisions of Rule 1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
which contemplates a "liberal" construction of the Rules
generally. Id. at 817. If, per Gallardo a "motion for
relief from judgment" tolls the running of the appeal
period, then the Plaintiffs' motion should likewise toll
the appeal period.
In Watkiss & Campbell vs Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061
(Utah 1991) , the Utah Supreme Court

in considering the

effect of the "motion for reconsideration"

wrote:

Nevertheless, had Foa appropriately entitled
its motion as one for a new trial, the effect
would have been to ask the court to reconsider
the summary judgment, and it would have tolled
the time period to file an appeal. Under the
facts of this case, the incorrect title placed
upon the pleading was not a bar to defendant's
case. Indeed, the record reflects that the
judge ruled on the motion as if it were a
motion for a new trial. Because the court
9

treated the motion to reconsider as a motion
for a new trial, we conclude that the filing of
the motion tolled the time in which to file an
appeal. Thus, the time period to file an appeal
began to run against Foa when the judge signed
the order of denial. Because the court signed
the order on January 3, 198 9, and Foa timely
filed its notice of appeal on January 31, 1989,
we are not without jurisdiction to hear this
appeal.
808 P. 2d 1064-1065. Emphasis added. Citations (footnotes)
to cases omitted.
The

foregoing

(quoted)

essentially what happened

text

(from Watkiss)

is

in the instant situation.

Indeed, close examination of the Appellant's "Motion"
(albeit

through

the

supporting

"Memorandum"

filed

concurrently therewith) , has the affirmative request (and
consequently "the effect", Watkiss, supra) to the trial
court to "reconsider the summary judgment" [Id. at 1064] .
To that situation the Supreme Court wrote that the
"motion for reconsideration"
" • . . would have tolled the time period to
file an appeal."
Id. Emphasis added.
In Ron Shepherd Insurance, Incorporated vs Shields,
882

P.2d

presented

650
with

(Utah
a

1994),

factual

the

Supreme

situation

not

Court

was

materially

dissimilar to many of the procedural "facts" (at the
trial court level) involved in the instant case. In

10

Shields the Supreme Court wrote:
It is settled law that a trial court is free to
reassess its decision at any point prior to
entry of a final order of judgment. Bennion v.
Hansen, 699 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985). In the
present case, because no final order awarding
defendants summary judgment was signed and
entered, the matter was still pending when
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was
filed in Judge Lewis's court. She had every
right to fully reassess the matter and, if
deemed appropriate, to receive additional
evidence.
882 P.2d at 654. Emphasis added.
It was in the above-referenced context that the
instant "motion for reconsideration1', as in Shields, was
filed: to point out to the District Court the error of
its earlier ruling.
The

instant

"motion"

was

very,

very

timely:

actually, pre-judgment2. The "motion for reconsideration"
was actually filed within days of receipt of the District
Court's

"Memorandum

Decision".

C.f.

Salt

Lake

City

Corporation vs James Construction, 761 P. 2d 42 (Utah App
1988), in which the appellant waited almost sixteen
months after the original summary judgment to file the
"motion to reconsider": in such an abusive situation, the
2

The "motion for reconsideration" was filed on or
about June 9th. The actual "summary judgment" was not
signed and entered until on or about June 16th. The
"motion for reconsideration" was not resolved by the
District Court until July 21st. The notice of appeal was
filed on or about August 4th.
11

"motion to reconsider" obviously should not "toll" or
effectively

"defeat"

the

30-day

"notice

of appeal"

requirement.
In Trembly vs Mrs Fields Cookies, 884 P. 2d 13 06
(Utah App 1994) , the defendant had filed a "motion for
reconsideration", concerning which the Court of Appeals
wrote:
Because the substance, not caption of a motion
is dispositive in determining the character of
the motion, see State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041,
1044 (Utah App. 1994), we will treat Mrs.
Fields's motion as a Rule 54(b) motion.
884 P.2d at 1310. Footnote #2.
The instant situation is not factually and legally
distinguishable from that presented in the decision of
the Utah Court of Appeals in the case of Salt Lake Knee
& Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. vs Salt Lake City Knee &
Sports Medicine, 909 P.2d 266 (Utah App 1995), in which
the Court of Appeals described the filing of a "motion
for reconsideration" as follows:
. . . the court granted summary judgment in
favor of Physicians on November 15, 1993.
Rehabilitation
filed
a
"motion
for
reconsideration" of the trial court ruling on
November 29, 1993. The trial court heard the
motion on January 28, 1994, and again ruled in
favor of Physicians. An order to this effect
was entered on March 14, 1994. On April 11,
1994, Rehabilitation filed this appeal.
909

P. 2d

at

268.

Concerning

12

the

"motion

for

reconsideration" and/or its effect upon the timeliness of
the

filing

of

the

"notice of

appeal", the Court of

Appeals in Salt Lake Knee further wrote:
Physicians argues that Rehabilitation's
motion for reconsideration did not toll the
running of the time in which to appeal, and
hence Rehabilitation's appeal was untimely. It
is by now well established that the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure do not provide for a "motion
for reconsideration" of a trial court's ruling.
Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d
650, 653 n. 4 (Utah 1994); accord Watkiss &
Campbell v. Foa & Sons, 808 P.2d 1961, 1064
(Utah 1991). Nonetheless, we have "reviewed
motions so entitled if they could have properlybeen brought under some rule and were merely
incorrectly titled." Shields, 882 P.2d at 653
n. 4; see also Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies,
884 P.2d 1306, 1310 n. 2 (Utah App. 1994)
(noting that "the substance, not caption, of a
motion is dispositive in determining the
character of the motion").
In this case, Rehabilitation captioned its
motion
as a motion
for
reconsideration.
However,
our
review
indicates
that
the
substance
of
the motion was
essentially
identical to a motion for new trial under Rule
59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Specifically, Rehabilitation argued that the
trial court made several errors of law which
are grounds for relief under Rule 59(a) (7) . In
addition,
by
conducting
a
hearing
and
reaffirming its legal conclusions, the trial
court ruled upon the motion as if it were a
motion for new trial. Therefore, as in Watkiss
& Campbell,
[u] nder the facts of this case, the
incorrect title placed on the pleading
was not a bar to the defendant's case.
Indeed, the record reflects that the
judge ruled on the motion as if it
were made for a new trial. Because the
court treated the motion to reconsider
as a motion for new trial, we conclude
that the filing of the motion tolled
13

the time in which to file an appeal.
Id. at 1064-1065 (footnotes omitted).
We conclude that Rehabilitation' s motion to
reconsider is substantively a motion for new
trial, and as such tolled the time for filing
an appeal. Rehabilitation's appeal was timely.
909

P.2d

at

268-269.

Emphasis

added.

Citations

to

footnotes in original have been omitted.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, was obviously
not

following

even

its

own

previous

rulings

and

precedents. That's inherently unfair to the Petitioners,
who are thus forced to guess as to the trial court's
handling of the "motion to reconsider".
Examining

the

Plaintiffs'

"motion

for

reconsideration" (including the supporting Memorandum)
[APPENDIX #2, hereto], the thrust of the "motion for
reconsideration" is "substantively"

(Salt Lake Knee,

supra) and

(Salt Lake Knee,

"essentially

identical"

supra) to a "motion for new trial" and/or, perhaps more
closely, a motion to "alter or amend judgment" (i.e. to
not enter the judgment in favor of the Defendant, as the
District Court's Memorandum Decision was proposing to
do) . A reading of the Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law
identifies numerous "errors in law" [see Rule 59(a) (7)]
which the District Court had made in evaluating the
claims and the evidence, as reflected in the District
Court's Memorandum Decision.
14

The Court of Appeals Decision seemingly focuses—
unreasonably and unrealistically so

upon the District

Court's handling (i.e. "treatment" and/or "construction")
of the "motion for reconsideration". That methodology
arguably closely patterning what the District Court
seemingly did

undermines the substantive effect of the

Watkiss holding, as follows: if the District Court
concludes the motion should be "treated" as a motion for
new trial, and does so, then the "motion to reconsider",
although denied, tolls the running of the appeal period.
If, however, the District Court does not so "treat" the
"motion", then

arguably

the "motion" does not toll

the running of the appeal period. The dilemma created by
this result-oriented standard, if allowed to stand, is
unfair and unwise and contradicts this Court's directive
in Watkiss and the other cases. An unduly rigid, resultoriented (i.e. examine how the trial court "treats" the
motion,

rather

than

looking

at

the motion

itself)

discourages the laudatory effect the instant "motion" (to
reconsider) had: of pointing out to the District Court
the

obvious

inconsistencies

within

its

"Memorandum

Decision", upon which a proposed "judgment" would be
based. Because the moving party could not necessarily
anticipate

the

District

Court's

15

resolution

of

the

"reconsideration"

issues placed before

the District

Court, the movant is at a severe disadvantage: if the
District Court rules on the "motion" (and denies the
same) later than the 30-day period in which to file a
"notice of appeal", arguably the movant is thus precluded
from

seeking

appellate

review:

the

worst

of

all

scenarios. If time is perceived to be "short", the other
side of that "Hobson's choice" dilemma manifests itself:
the moving party, out of uncertainty as to the trial
court's "treatment" of the motion is motivated to file a
"notice

of

appeal", which

effectively

deprives

the

District Court of all continuing jurisdiction over the
case. Both scenarios deprive the District Court of an
opportunity

to

"self-correct"

the Court's

erroneous

ruling. Similarly, both scenarios unnecessarily impose
upon the appellate courts an unnecessary burden, which if
the District Court had the opportunity to fix, might not
be thrust upon the appellate courts and upon the partylitigants. While
appellate

courts)

the Court

of Appeals

is understandably

(as are all

concerned

about

uniform and consistent application of the "30-day rule"
for

filing

uncertainties

the

"notice

which

will

of
arise

appeal",
from

the

given

the

standards

established by the Decision are unfair and unwise. While

16

the Court of Appeals desires timely filed appeals, it
would seem that a "motion for reconsideration", the
"substantively" and "essentially identical" to a "motion
for new trial" and/or a

"motion to alter or amend

judgment" should have the effect of tolling the running
of the "appeal period". Otherwise, the trial court is
effectively deprived of the opportunity to "self-correct"
its own facially-obvious errors of judgment. A hard-andfast rule, applied with Draconian rigor, will not result
in fewer appeals; on the contrary, such will result in
more appeals to the appellate courts, as non-prevailing
counsel
altogether

unwilling

to

risk

the

loss

of

appeal

will simply forego the opportunity to ask

the District Court to "self-correct" the problem.
Given

the

seemingly

uncertain

standards

to be

applied, the Supreme Court should resolve the problem, at
least for the sake of practitioners who are arguably left
to guess as to a trial court's future ruling.
Similarly, the Rules ought not be applied in a rigid
"timing" or "sequential" manner, to deprive a party who
has acted in a timely and good faith manner, from
pursuing an appeal in those cases where the District
Court, given the opportunity to fix the errors arising
from its "judgment" as first reflected in its "Memorandum

17

Decision"

refuses

to

change

the

"Judgment"

entered

thereon.
Thus, until the District Court ruled (on or about 21
July 2004) to deny the "motion", the time for filing the
"notice of appeal" was tolled. Thus, the 4 August 2004
filing of the "notice of appeal" was timely.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs' "motion for reconsideration" was
"substantively" (Salt Lake Knee, supra) and "essentially
identical" (Salt Lake Knee, supra) to a "motion for new
trial" and/or, perhaps more closely, a motion to "alter
or amend judgment" (i.e. to not enter the judgment in
favor

of

the

Defendant,

as

the

District

Court's

Memorandum Decision was proposing to do) . The Plaintiffs'
Memorandum of Law identified numerous "errors in law"
[see Rule 59(a) (7)] which the District Court had made in
evaluating the claims and the evidence, as reflected in
the District Court's Memorandum Decision. The appellate
courts should encourage

not penalize

this kind of

attempt to point out to the trial court the opportunity
and

necessity

to

"self-correct"

errors

within

its

adjudicative decisions.
The

Decision

of

the

Court

of

Appeals

readily

conflicts with previous decisions of other panels of the

18

Court of Appeals deciding the same issue: Mrs Fields
Cookies, supra, and Salt Lake Knee, supra.
The

Decision

of

the

Court

of

Appeals

readily

conflicts with previous decisions of the Utah Supreme
Court: Gallardo, supra, Shields, supra, and Watkiss &
Campbell, supra, and other appellate cases cited therein.
The

Supreme

Court

should

reverse

the Court of

Appeals Decision and reinstate the appeal. The Supreme
Court should remand the case
the Court

as in Gallardo

of Appeals, with directions

back to

to hear the

substantive appeal on the merits (propriety of summary
judgment).
The

Supreme

Court

apart

from

(certiorari review) process in this case

the

"appeal"

ought to also

consider an "amendment" to the Rules of Civil Procedure,
if only to clarify the issue and bring the text of the
"Rules" into conformity with the announced "case law".
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of June, 2005.

DAVID K GILLETT and
MAJESTIC AIR SERVICES, INC.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF FOR CERTIORARI REVIEW OF A
DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS to be mailed,
first-class postage prepaid, to Mr Randall L Skeen,
Attorney at Law, Cook, Skeen & Robinson LLC, 5788 South
900 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84121, this 3rd day of
June, 2005
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX #1:
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
[DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT]
9 June 2 004

STEPHEN G HOMER (153 6)
Attorney at Law
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Telephone (801) 561-9665
Attorney for Plaintiffs
DAVID K GILLETT and MAJESTIC AIR SERVICES, INC.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
SANDY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID K GILLETT, and MAJESTIC
AIR SERVICES, INCORPORATED,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs

PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
[DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT]

vs
STEVE PRICE,

Civil No. 030401300
Defendant

Case assigned to Judge Burton

The Plaintiffs DAVID K GILLETT and MAJESTIC AIR SERVICES move
the Court to reconsider its decision concerning the Defendant's
motion for summary judgment.
The factual and legal basis of this Motion for Reconsideration
are more fully described in PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

[DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT], filed concurrently herewith.
Respectfully submitted this 9th of June, 2004.
original signed
STEPHEN G HOMER
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE
I certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION [DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT] to be
mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to Mr Randall L Skeen,
Attorney at Law, Cook, Skeen & Robinson, LLC, 5788 South 900 East,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121, this 9th day of June, 2004.
original signed by SGH
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ATTORNEY AT LAW
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APPENDIX #2
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
[DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT]
9 June 2 004

STEPHEN G HOMER (1536)
Attorney at Law
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Telephone (801) 561-9665
Attorney for Plaintiffs
DAVID K GILLETT and MAJESTIC AIR SERVICES, INC.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
SANDY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID K GILLETT, and MAJESTIC
AIR SERVICES, INCORPORATED,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
[DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT]

vs
STEVE PRICE,

Civil No. 030401300
Defendant

Case assigned to Judge Burton

The Plaintiffs DAVID K GILLETT and MAJESTIC AIR SERVICES file
the following PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION

FOR

RECONSIDERATION

[DEFENDANT'S

MOTION

FOR

SUMMARY

JUDGMENT].
ARGUMENT
The single dispositive issue-at-hand is whether or not the
pleaded "cause of action" against the Defendant falls within the 6year statute of limitation set by Section 78-12-23, Utah Code. That
Section provides in relevant part:
An action may be brought within six years:

(2)

upon

any

contract/

obligation,

EXHIBIT #2

or

liability founded
writing, . . .

upon

an

instrument

in

Emphasis added. Reference to the specific terms of the statute are
pertinent, so as to not fall into the narrowing "trap" of thinking
(or remembering)

that

the

statute

applies

only

to

"written

contracts". The statute says "obligation, or liability founded upon
an instrument in writing . . .".
The former employer-employee relationship existing between
Plaintiff MAJESTIC and Defendant STEVE PRICE, especially in his
role as "Parts Manager" in which he stole the 32 radios entrusted
to him, is, for these purposes a contractual relationship: the
employee

provides

personal

services

in

furtherance

of

the

employer's needs and expectations, and the employer pays the
employee. The "instrument in writing" in this case can be the "job
description"

and

the

employee's

"proposal"

both

of

which

Defendant PRICE signed.
The Court has characterized the two waitings as "written
preliminary proposals". Such is not only inaccurate, but the
dispute as to what those writings actually are, is the very
"genuine dispute as to material fact" which should
reason alone

for that

preclude the Court from granting summary judgment.

The PRICE proposal was

the operative

representation, by the

employee, under which he solicited AND RECEIVED the promotion to
Parts Manager. The "job description" describes the expected duties
and responsibilities.
The "job description"—in specific and in general tone —
2
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expressly states that the employer "expects" that "honesty and
integrity are the benchmark of performance". For Defendant PRICE to
have secretly stolen the 32 radios, sent those radios to Florida,
and personally pocketed

the proceeds

from

the

illicit sale,

certainly violates that "obligation" (to be honest).
In any event, the fact alone that the parties disagree over
the legal effect of the written instruments

is the

"genuine

dispute" as to material fact which should preclude the summary
judgment!
The Defendant, through counsel, has raised the "contract to
hold property" as an issue. It is unfortunate that the Court has
seemingly

"bought

into"

that

argument. That

"hold

property"

phrasing was never part of the Plaintiff's pl.eaded claims, which
focus more upon an "entrustment"

(Paragraph ,13 and 14 of the

Complaint) concept. The issue is whether or not the Defendant's
obligation arises from the "instrument in writing", as the statute
of limitation is so worded. In that context, the Defendant has not
shown otherwise. [The Defendant's only affidavit was to the effect
that he didn't recall signing anything. Well, his recollection was
inaccurate.]
For the record: the Plaintiffs NEVER have claimed or pleaded
a "bailment" issue, in the classic usage of that concept. The
"bailment" idea was merely the invention and/or mischaracter;ization
of

the

Plaintiff's

"bailment" claim—as

claims

by

the

Defendant's

such never raised—was

3
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counsel.

The

consequently not

"abandoned", as the Court incorrectly notes.
The Court has seemingly focused upon the term "hold property".
That phrase is not in the contract. But it is not necessarily in
the pleading. The pleading

speaks

for

itself. The

complaint

satisfies the requires of Utah law for "notice pleading".
The

Court

accurate

characterizes—mischaracterizes
the two written instrument

as

is

probably

more

"written preliminary

proposals". This is an incorrect assessment, of both fact and law.
The characterization OVERLOOKS the evidence, and/or the disputed
evidence: namely, that Mr Gillett

through Affidavit

testified

in essence that:
1.

He relied upon PRICE'S representations and promoted

him to the Parts Manager position.
2.

Within

that

Parts

Manager

position,

PRICE was

entrusted with the custody of the radios, etc., for which
he was supposed to carefully account for and to "better
parts and inventory control and management."
3.

In

that

"obligations

setting,
and

Price

responsibilities

utilizes the term "liabilities")
took

the

radios

in

from

the

breach
(Section

of

his

78-12-23

stole the radios: he

constructive

custody

of

Majestic, sent the radios to Florida, pocketed the $$$
into his personal

checking account, and would have gone

undetected, but for a fortuitous event unrelated to the
actual theft.

4
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The point is that it is insignificant that the written instruments
do not specifically utilize the phrase "to hold property". The
whole idea is implicit in the "Parts Manager" concept. That's what
Parts Managers do. That was understood by all parties.
In Durham vs Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977), the Utah
Supreme Court observed: from page 1334.
The summary judgement procedure has the desirable and
salutary purpose of eliminating the time, trouble and
expense of a trial when there are no issues of fact in
dispute and the controversy can be resolved as a matter
of law. Nevertheless, that should not be done on
conjecture, but only when the matter is clear; and in
case of doubt, the doubt should be resolved in allowing
the challenged party the opportunity of at least
attempting to prove his right to recover.
For that
reason the "submissions" should be looked at in the light
favorable to her position; and unless the court is able
to conclude that there is no dispute on material facts,
which if resolved in her favor would entitle her to
recover, the court should not summarily reject her claim
and render judgment against her as a matter of law. Upon
review, -we apply the same standard as that applied by
the trial court.
571 P.2d at 1334. Emphasis added. Citations to footnotes omitted.
See also Diamond B-Y Ranches vs Tooele County, 2004 UT App 135
(Utah Court of Appeals, 29 April 2004), S 13.
The

Court's

ruling,

in

favor

of

the

Defendant

on

the

"genuinely disputed issue of material fact" (i.e. the operative
nature of the "obligation based upon an instrument in writing")
does the very thing which Margetts and Diamond B-Y Ranches says
trial courts are not to do!
The

heart

and

essence

of

the

Court's

ruling—thus

necessitating this Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration—is

5
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illuminated by the Court's "memorandum decision" and particularly
by the Defendant's proposed "finding #8" in the "Findings and Order
of Summary Judgment", thus:
8.
The Court finds that, viewing the facts in a light
most favorable to Plaintiffs, the written documents
provided by Plaintiffs failed to show that there was a
written contract between Plaintiffs and Defendant to hold
property on behalf of Plaintiffs and that the parties'
agreement was oral.
Emphasis added. On the basis of the foregoing, the Court concludes
that the parties' "agreement was oral", thus invoking the 4-year
statute of limitation. This illogical conclusion

directly in the

face of the evidence (i.e. there WAS A WRITTEN AGREEMENT, ala the
"proposal" signed by the Defendant to get the "Parts Department
Manager" position AND the "job description" for the "Parts Manager"
position, ALSO SIGNED by the Defendant)

simply doesn't follow,

for numerous reasons.
First, because there was a "written agreement", signed by
the Defendant. Within the employer-employee relationship
reflected by those written documents.
Secondly, it is incredible for the Court to conclude
there is "no written contract" when the very written
documents

are

quite

literally

before

the

Court!

[Plaintiffs claim the "job description" (i.e. "honesty
and integrity are the benchmarks of performance") define
the "obligation and liability" based upon the "instrument
in writing", sufficient for the statute.
The Court, in its Ruling, "finds" that there is no genuine
6
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dispute as to material fact. Such is patently in error, given the
Court's additional finding that the "contract" between the parties
was "oral".
On Page 6 of the Court's Memorandum Decision, the Court
correctly frames the issue before the Court, thus:
The issue, therefore, is whether there was a written
contract for Defendant to hold property on behalf of
Plaintiff. If so, then the original complaint was timely
filed and the saving statute would apply to the present
complaint and the proposed amended complaint. If,
however, there was no written contract for Defendant to
hold property on behalf of Plaintiff, then the original
complaint was untimely and the savings statute does not
apply.
Upon review of the written documents, the Court concludes
that even viewing the written documents in a light most
favorable to the Plaintiff, the written documents
proffered by Plaintiff fail to show that there was a
written contract between Plaintiff and Defendant to hold
property on behalf of Plaintiff; therefore, the parties
agreement was o r a l . . . .
Emphasis added.
The phrase "to hold property on behalf of Plaintiff", as
recited by the Court as quoted above, is not per se material or
critical to the case or its summary judgment disposition. The
phrase was "coined" and utilized by the Defendant, in "moving
target fashion", as the Defendant has tried to distort the facts,
by saying that the written agreements were -"merely employment
agreements". As if that phrasing had a specialized term-of-art
significance under the law; it doesn't. [Does the fact th^t it is
an "employment contract" not implicitly admit the existence of "a
contract", thus precluding judgment in favor of the Defendant, as
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a matter of law?]
The

actual

phrasing

paragraphs 13 and 14

of

the

Plaintiffs

complaint

at

utilize the phrasing of "property entrusted

to the Defendant" in his Parts Manager capacity. In light of the
"notice pleading" as allowed by Utah, even this "notice pleading"
brevity is sufficient to apprise the Defendant

who knows exactly

what he is being sued for and the specifics of the incident and his
conduct therein which are the basis for the liability.
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision is facially inconsistent. The "written"
documents presented
particularly

when

and the interpretation to be given thereto,
the

two

sides

themselves

cannot

agree

constitute the very "genuine dispute as to material fact" which
precludes summary judgment.
The Court should reconsider its ruling. The Defendant's motion
(for summary judgment) must be denied.
Respectfully submitted this 9th of June, 2004.
original signed
STEPHEN G HOMER
Attorney for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE
I certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS'
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
[DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT] to be mailed, first-class
postage prepaid, to Mr Randall L Skeen, Attorney at Law, Cook,
Skeen & Robinson, LLC, 5788 South 900 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
84121, this 9th day of June, 2004.
original signed by SGH
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APPENDIX #3
District Court
"Minute Entry/Memorandum Decision"
denying "Motion for Reconsideration"
[21/27 July 2004]

IN Tl IE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SANDY DEPARTMENT

DAVID K. G1LLETT, and MAJESTIC AIR
SERVICES, INCORPORATED, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

ORDER

STEVE PRICE,

Judge ROYAL I HANSEN

Case No 030401300

Defendant

The above mattei comes before the Court for decision on David K Gillett and Majestic
Air Services, Incorporated's (Plaintiffs) motion for reconsideration By way of memorandum
decision the Court granted Steve Price's motion for summary judgment on May 26, 2004.
Plaintiffs now challenge that memorandum decision Upon review of the parties filings and the
Court's previous decision, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs motion fails to satisfy the standard
for relief Accordingly, Plainuits motion for ieconsideration is DENIED.
Dated this " M clay of July, 2004

By the Court*...;' ' / %

ROYAL I HANSEN
Third District Court Judge
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SANDY COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID K GILLETT,
Plaintiff,

OPDER

vs.

Case No: 030401300

STEVE PRICE,
Defendant.

Judge: ROYAL I HANSEN
Date: 07/27/2004

Clerk: dwank
UPON REVIEW OF THE PARTIES FILINGS AND THE COURT'S PREVIOUS
DECISION, THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT PLAINTIFFS MOTION FAILS TO
SATISFY THE STANDARD FOR RELIEF. ACCORDINGLY, PLAINTIFFS MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DENIED.

STAMPajSep.^T DIRECTION OF JUDfQE
AK
^
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APPENDIX #4
Decision of the Court of Appeals [2004 UT App 460]
Appellate Case No. 2004-0682CA
[9 December 2004]

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

DEC 0 9 2004
IN THE UT£H COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
David K Gillett and Majestic
Air Services, Inc
a Utah
corporation,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

20040682-CA

F I L E D
(December 9, 2004)

v
[2004 UT App 460
Steve Price,
Defendant and Appellee

Third District, Sandy Depaitmenl
The Honorable Royal I Hansen
Attorneys

Stephen G
Randall L

Homer, West Jordan, for Appellants
Skeen, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Orme.
PER CURIAMThis matter is before the court on motions by this court and
Appellee Steve Price for summaiy dismissal on the basis of lack
of jurisdiction
See Utah R App P 10
The civil claim filed
in district court related to allegations of theft of property.
The district court granted Price's motion for summary judgment in
an order issued on June 16, 2004.
In response to the court'c order, Appellant David Gillett
filed a motion captioned "Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration
[Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment]." This motion was
filed on June 9, 2004, after tne initial ruling on the motion for
summary judgment was made but prior to issuance of the final
order
Gillett argued m the motion for reconsideration that the
district court mischaiactenzect the documents relied upon in
determining the statute oi limitations had expired on Gillett1s
claim
Gillett also argued m the motion that factual issues
existed and, as a result, sumniry judgment was improper.
Gillett ' s notice of appeal, was filed on August 4, 2004. The
notice of appeal was not timely filed from the order granting
summary judgment, which was tb- final judgment. While Gillett's
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notice of appeal purports to appeal the denial of his motion to
reconsider, he argues in his response to the motions for summary
dismissal that the motion to reconsider should be construed as
either a motion to alter or amend judgment or a motion for a new
trial, pursuant to rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. He cites Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation v.
Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine, 909 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah
1995) and Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1065
(Utah 1991), in support of his proposition.
If construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment or a
motion for a new trial, Gillett's notice of appeal would be
timely because these are post-trial motions, enumerated in rule
4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which toll the
time for filing a notice of appeal until thirty days after
issuance of an order denying the post-trial motion. See Watkiss
& Campbell, 808 P.2d at 1064.
Gillett's motion, however, is not properly construed as a
motion to amend or alter judgment or as a motion for a new trial.
There is no indication that the trial court construed Gillett's
motion as either a motion to alcer or amend the judgment or as a
motion for a new trial. Furthermore, the motion does not meet
the requirements for either motion.
This court reviews the rulings of the trial court.
Therefore, this court considers whether the trial court has
abused its discretion in construing, or not construing, a motion
to reconsider as a motion that tolls the time for filing a notice
of appeal. Nothing in the district court's order denying
Gillett's motion indicates that the court construed Gillett's
motion as anything other than a motion to reconsider. Thus the
district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
construe the motion as a rule 4(b) motion, especially given that
the motion does not meet the requirements of a rule 59 motion.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a) , (e) .
Because Gillett's notice of appeal was timely from the order
denying the motion to reconsider, the question remains whether
this court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal of that order.
Because the rules of civil procedure do not allow for a motion to
reconsider, such a motion will be reviewed only if it could been
properly brought under a rule, based on its substance, but was
incorrectly captioned. See Salt Lake Knee & Sports
Rehabilitation, 909 P.2d at 268. As we have already explained,
Gillette's motion cannot be construed as a motion made under the
rules of civil procedure.
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For the forgoing reasons, this appeal is dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction because of an untimely notice of appeal
Price seeks attorney fees and costs based on rules 33 and 34
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Price has not
sufficiently argued, and we do not conclude, that this appeal was
frivolous or for purposes of delay
We therefore decline to
award attorney fees
Costs are awarded by operation of rule
34 (a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

W[ ,

^JJ4^P^

lith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge

Russell W Bench,
Associate Presiding Judge

£^?£gory K. Orme, Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of December, 2004, a true
and correct copy of the attached DECISION was deposited in the
United States mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be
delivered to:
STEPHEN G. HOMER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
9225 S REDWOOD RD
WEST JORDAN UT 8 4 088
RANDALL L. SKEEN
COOK SKEEN & ROBINSON LLC
5788 S 900 E
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8 4121
HONORABLE ROYAL I HANSEN
THIRD DISTRICT, SANDY DEPT
210 W 10000 S
SANDY UT 84070-3282

Judicial Secretary s
TRIAL COURT: THIRD DISTRICT, SANDY DEPT, 030401300
APPEALS CASE NO.: 20040682-CA
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